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CIVIL PROCEDURE-The Adoption of the Collateral
Order Doctrine in New Mexico: Carrillo v. Rostro
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Carrillo v. Rostro,' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
defendant school board members, who refused to renew the plaintiff's
administrative contract because of her criticism of the school board's
actions at a public meeting, were not entitled to a defense of qualified
immunity against plaintiff's civil right's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988).2 In addition, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the trial
court's denial of summary judgment on defendant's qualified immunity
defense was reviewable before trial' under the collateral order doctrine
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp.4 The New Mexico Supreme Court also adopted
the writ of error as the procedural device to invoke the collateral order
doctrine.'
Using the context of a qualifed immunity defense against a civil rights
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this Note explores the process by which
the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the collateral order doctrine
and the implications of that decision. This Note also examines the rationale
of the Carrillo court in adopting the writ of error as the procedural
device for invoking the doctrine.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At a 1987 public meeting, Principal Rose Mary Carrillo voiced her
opposition to a proposed action of the Bernalillo Board of Education.
Her opposition centered on the Board's position with regard to makeup days and the Board's commitment to quality education. Board members
allege that her tone was abrasive, harassing, inappropriate and unpro6
fessional.

1. 114 N.M. 607, 845 P.2d 130 (1992).
2. "Every person, who under color of any statute [or] regulation ... of any State ... causes
to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution
... shall be liable to the party injured . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
In Carrillo, plaintiff (a state employee) sued individual state defendants for an alleged violation
of her First and Fourteenth Amendment right to speak at a public meeting on a matter of public
concern.
3. Carrillo, 114 N.M. 607, 845 P.2d 130.
4. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
5. Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 616, 845 P.2d. at 139.
6. The plaintiff and the defendant disagreed as to the exact details and nuances of plaintiff's
address to the Board. Rostro alleged Carrillo's tone and demeanor were inappropriate and unprofessional, i.e., shaking her finger at the board and loudly proclaiming, "Hey you don't care about
these kids, all you care about is taking off for those three days." Brief for Appellant at 7, Carrillo
v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 845 P.2d 130 (1992) (No. 19,650). Carrillo alleged that she did not raise
her voice nor did she jump up and down or shake her finger at the Board. Id. at 2. "Her speech
was strong in favor of her opinion, but not critical of the Board." Id.
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In 1988, the Board, basing its decision "in part" on Carrillo's behavior
at the 1987 meeting, voted not to renew Carrillo's administrative contract.7
In response, Carrillo filed a suit against the Board in their official
capacities as members of the Bernalillo Board of Education seeking relief
for violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). However,
Carrillo amended her complaint when it became clear that the Board
could not be sued for money damages in its official capacity under section
1983.8 The amended complaint sought relief under section 1983 against
the defendants in their individual capacities. 9
The amended complaint alleged that the Board's decision not to renew

her administrative contract was made in retaliation for comments and

opinions expressed at the March 1987 meeting.' 0 Carrillo alleged that the
Board violated her First Amendment rights to free speech and her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process."
The defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity, and filed a
summary judgment motion on all of plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff
argued that there were genuine issues of material fact with regard to

free speech' 2 and the existence of an implied contract of employment

which would give rise.to a procedural due process right. 3 The trial court
refused to certify the qualified immunity
denied summary judgment and
4
issue for immediate review.'
On appeal, defendants made two arguments: 1) that New Mexico should
recognize a pretrial right of appeal from a district court's denial of a
public official's motion for summary judgment seeking qualified immunity
from a section 1983 claim, and 2) that the trial court erred in refusing
to grant them qualified immunity.' 5

7. Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 610, 845 P.2d at 134.
8. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), decided after Carrillo brought
suit. Will, denied a promotion, filed suit against the Department of State Police and the Director
of State Police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court held that neither the state nor its
officials acting in their official capacities were "persons" within the meaning of the federal civil
rights statute. Id. at 71.
9. Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 610, 845 P.2d at 134.
10. Id. at 611, 845 P.2d at 133. In addition to the free speech claim and the deprivation of
her interest in continued employment without due process of law, the plaintiff also alleged that the
Board had breached an implied employment contract and failed to allow her to inspect public
records in violation of N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-1 to -3 (1978). Yet, the only issues on appeal
involve the plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
11. Carillo, 114 N.M. at 610, 845 P.2d at 134.
12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13. The plaintiff eventually abandoned her procedural due process claim because the law on
whether an implied contract could be found, based on past conduct and dealings with the employer,
was not clearly established at the time of her suit. Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20, 766
P.2d. 280 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109 (1989), decided seven months after Carrillo's suit,
established that an implied employment contract may be found to exist from the "totality of the
parties' relationship." The court also noted that Kestenbaum involved private employers and not
government employers. The difference between private employers and government employers such
as a school board concerning contracts is that all employment contracts with a government entity
must be in writing. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-23(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
14. Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 622-23, 845 P.2d. at 145-46.
15. Id. at 611, 845 P.2d. at 134.
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The New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the collateral order doctrine
to allow review of summary judgments denying qualified immunity defenses to claims of violation of plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Moreover, the court chose the writ of error as the implementation
device for invoking the collateral order doctrine.
III.

HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE
COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE

A.

The Creation of the Collateral Order Doctrine
Under federal law, the collateral order doctrine allows appellate courts
to grant immediate review to a small class of interlocutory orders which
1) conclusively determine a disputed question, 2) resolve an important
issue which is separate from and collateral to the merits of the claim,
3) decide an issue which would be effectively unreviewable when a final
judgment on the merits was entered, and 4) which presents a serious
6
and unsettled question.'
Title 28 of the United States Code gives the appellate courts jurisdiction
over appeals which are "final decisions" of district courts. 17 To comply
with 28 U.S.C. § 1291,1 s appellate courts must determine which orders
from the lower courts are final for the purposes of jurisdiction and
subsequent appeal.' 9 Ordinarily a final order is one that disposes of the
case. 20 When a court issues an order which does not address the merits
of the case, it does not finally dispose of the matter. Nevertheless, an
order may address a right which could be irreparably lost if review were
not permitted prior to taking the merits to a full trial. 2' Examples of
claimed rights which could be lost if an immediate appeal were disallowed
23
are the right to absolute immunity 22 and to qualified immunity.
24
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. recognized the "serious
and unsettled question ' 25 created by the loss of a claimed right. The
threshold issue in Cohen was whether the district court's order refusing
to apply a New Jersey statute requiring complainants to give security for
the reasonable expenses of the suit in the event the suit failed was an

16. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988); see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 545 (1949). The purpose of the final decision requirement is to maintain the review status of
the court of appeals and prevent its intervention in the lower court proceedings which are "tentative,
informal or incomplete." Id. at 546.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). "The court of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ... except where a direct review may
be had in the Supreme Court." Id.
19. See generally Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 612-14, 845 .P.2d 130, 135-37 (1992).
20. Id. at 613, 845 P.2d at 136.
21. Id.
22. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
23. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
24. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
25. Id. at 547.
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appealable one. 26 The Court determined that the district court's refusal
to apply the statute did not go to the merits of the case but to a claimed
right. 27 If the trial continued to final judgment then the rights conferred
by the statute would be lost "probably irreparably." ' 2 In its reasoning,
the Court determined that the New Jersey statute allowing for reasonable
expenses "fall[s] in that small class which finally determine claims of
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too
important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself
to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case
is adjudicated.' '29 In announcing the collateral order doctrine, the Court
held that the district court's order was a final disposition of a claimed
right which30 is not an ingredient of the cause of action and was therefore
appealable.
Richardson-MerrellInc. v. Koller31 refined the collateral order doctrine
established in Cohen. The plaintiff brought suit against a drug manufacturer seeking damages for birth defects. On the question of whether
the disqualification of counsel in a civil case was a final decision appealable
under the collateral order doctrine, the Supreme Court determined that
the United States District Court's disqualification order was not a final
decision on the merits, and was therefore not subject to an immediate
appeal. 3 2 The Court, in its reasoning, refined and clarified the collateral
33
order doctrine as a narrow exception to a final judgment rule. To fall
within the exception, the order must: 1) conclusively determine a disputed
question; 2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action; and 3) concern a right that would be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. 3 4 By announcing the conditions for review, the Court clearly established that not all interlocutory
orders are reviewable.
B. The Application of the Collateral Order Doctrine by the United
States Supreme Court and the Appeals Court
Since announcing the collateral order doctrine in Cohen and refining
its applicability in Richardson, the United States Supreme Court has
invoked the collateral order doctrine to grant review of various interlocutory orders. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Company35 a contractor who was denied arbitration of a dispute

Id. at 545.
Id. at 546.
Id.
Id.
Id.
472 U.S. 424 (1985).
Id. at 429-30.
Id. at 430-31.
34. Id.; see also 9 JAMEs W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 73 (2d ed. 1993).
Moore notes that the third prong of the collateral doctrine is the most important. The final order
which is sought for review must involve a claimed right which would be essentially lost and
unretrievable if not appealed prior to an adjudication of the actual merits of the case. Id.
35. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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with the hospital under the Federal Arbitration Act sought relief in the
form of a petition for mandamus and by appeal.3 6 On certiorarito the
Supreme Court, the Court determined that the district court's stay order
regarding arbitration was a final order" and therefore appealable to
appellate courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.38 The Supreme Court reasoned
that even if the district court order was not final for the purpose of
appeal it would still fall within the exception to finality criteria set out
in Cohen.3 9 Furthermore, if the final order, which amounted to a refusal
to adjudicate, was not reviewable immediately it would effectively be
unreviewable on an appeal. 40
Similarly, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,41 President Nixon sought review of
an interlocutory order denying him absolute presidential immunity with
regard to the discharge of an Air Force management analyst. 42 In announcing its certiorari jurisdiction on the immunity issue, the United
States Supreme Court stated that Nixon's appeal fell within the collateral
order doctrine of Cohen and raised a "serious and unsettled" question
43
of law.
Abney v. United States" noted that the collateral order doctrine of
Cohen was applicable to both civil and criminal proceedings . In Abney,
a pretrial order which rejected claims of former jeopardy was determined
to be a final decision which met the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 12914
regarding jurisdiction to review final decisions.4 7 The defendant was thus
able to seek immediate review of the district court's rejection of his
double jeopardy claim.
In addition to the application of the collateral order doctrine in United
States Supreme Court cases, appellate courts in different states have also
adopted the collateral order doctrine.4 The courts have applied it in
granting review of various interlocutory orders.

36. Id.
37. Id. at 10. The Supreme Court held that a stay order is final when the sole purpose and
effect of the stay is precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal court to a state court. Id.
38. Id. at 2.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Id.
41. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
42. Id. at 731. In this case, the analyst testified to a congressional subcommitee on cost overruns
and technical problems in the development of a United States Air Force airplane. Fitzgerald was
dismissed in a department reorganization. He claimed retaliation and filed suit for damages. Nixon
claimed absolute immunity for the action.
43. Id. at 731-32. Presidential immunity reaches into essential presidential prerogatives inherent
in the office. It is reasoned that if the president is not immune to civil suit, he would not be able
to carry out the responsibilities of the office.
44. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
45. Id. at 659.
46. See supra note 21.
47. Abney, 431 U.S. at 658.
48. In Hatch v. Minot, 369 So. 2d 974 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 458 (Fla.
1979), the District Court of Appeals of Florida, citing Cohen, held that an interlocutory order in
eminent domain is a final order for the purposes of appeal. The eminent domain action which
determined the dispostion of funds was a final determination "of a particular matter . . . which
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New Mexico Courts and the Collateral Order Doctrine
The adoption of the collateral order doctrine in Carrilo v. Rostro49
is a case of first impression for New Mexico. Before the Carrillo case,
Cohen had been cited,50 but no appellate court had ruled on the collateral
order doctrine. The question of adopting the collateral order doctrine
5
came before the appellate court in Allen v. Board of Education. In
Allen, an order denying a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims and
an order for summary judgment based on the Tort Claims Act immunity
were before the court for review.5 2 The court concluded that the collateral
order doctrine as cited in Mitchell 3 did not apply in the case before the
court because the two motions up for review did not finally determine
a claim which is collateral to the actions.5 4 Therefore, the court declined
to rule on its adoption for New Mexico. 5
The collateral order doctrine again came before the New Mexico Supreme Court in Carrillo. A denial of a qualified immunity claim by the
Bernalillo School Board 5 6provided the setting for the adoption of the
collateral order doctrine.
C.

was separable from and collateral to that action" and, hence, was reviewable as a "final order"
even though it did not determine the eminent domain action. In Scroggins v. Edmondson, 297
S.E.2d 469 (Ga. 1982), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a superior court order on a motion
to cancel a lis pendens notice was directly appealable. Although under a traditional analysis, the
order would not be considered final because a trial on the merits was still pending, the order falls
within the collateral order exception of Cohen. The court stated that "an important right might
be lost if review had to await final judgment because the realty might be sold before conclusion
of the action, making cancellation 'effectively unreviewble on appeal."' Id. at 472.
Several other state appellate courts have likewise held various interlocutory orders appealable
under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen. In Ass'n of Owners of Kukui Plaza v. Swinerton &
Walgerg Co., 705 P.2d 28, 34 (Haw. 1985), an order denying motion for a stay pending arbitration
was deemed appealable, and in Jolley v. State, 384 A.2d 91, 94 (Md. 1978), an order finding
defendant incompetent to stand trial in a criminal case was appealable under Cohen's collateral
order doctrine.
49. 114 N.M. 607, 845 P.2d 130 (1992).
50. See Central-Southwest Dairy Coop. v. Am. Bank of Commerce, 78 N.M. 464, 432 P.2d
820 (1967). In this case the supreme court considered whether a judgment appealed from was a
decision final and appealable under Rule 54(b). Id. at 466, 432 P.2d at 822. The court mentioned
Cohen for the general premise that a final order need not be the last order possible made in the
disposition of a case. Id.; see also Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d
1033 (1992). In this case the supreme court held that the awarding of attorney fees while reserving
a exact determination of those fees until a future date was a final judgment for the purposes of
appeal. Id. The court cited Cohen for the premise that the question of finality is "a practical,
Id. at 240,
rather than technical term, and its meaning is to be developed from case to case .
824 P.2d 1042.
51. 106 N.M. 673, 748 P.2d 516 (Ct. App. 1987).
52. Allen, 106 N.M. at 673, 748 P.2d at 516.
53. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
54. Allen, 106 N.M. at 674, 748 P.2d at 517. The court reasoned that the immunity granted
by the Tort Claims Act is immunity from liability which is distinguishable from the immunity from
suit sought in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Moreover, the orders were neither collateral
to nor separate from the merits and therefore did not fit into the collateral order exceptions cited
in Mitchell.
55. Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 614, 845 P.2d at 137.
56. Id. at 623, 845 P.2d at 146.

Summer 19941

CARRILLO v. ROSTRO

IV.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

A.

The Rationale of the Carrillo Court
Two issues came before the Carrillo court. The first was "whether the
trial court's denial of summary judgment on defendants' qualified immunity defense was reviewable, before trial, under the collateral order
doctrine of [Cohen].'' 7 The second issue was whether the trial court
erred in refusing to grant defendant school board qualified immunity to8
plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims under section 1983 .
Consistent with the appeals process, the court first needed to determine
its jurisdiction. 9 New Mexico Statute section 39-3-2 is substantially similar
to federal law 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in that it provides for civil appeals from
district court. 6° The New Mexico Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear
an appeal from district court on any "final judgment." ' 6' Therefore, the
question before the court was whether summary judgment on the issue
of qualified immunity was a final decision and if so was it immediately
appealable in state as well as federal court.62
The New Mexico Supreme Court looked to federal case law to determine
the appealability of an order denying qualified immunity. 63 The court
referred to the reasoning of Mitchell in which the Court determined that
qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial under certain
circumstances. This right can be effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial." The irretrievability of this right places it clearly
within the exceptions outlined in the collateral order doctrine. With this
reasoning in mind, the supreme court determined that "the collateral
order applies and the court's denial of summary judgment is reviewable. "65
57. Id. at 609, 845 P.2d at 132.
58. The trial court denied summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity because there

was a factual dispute between plaintiff's and defendants' version of plaintiff's tone and demeanor
at the 1987 meeting. Id. at 609, 845 P.2d at 132.
59. Id. at 612, 845 P.2d at 135.
60. "Within thirty days from the entry of any final judgment or decision, any interlocutory
order or decision which practically disposes of the merits of the action, or any final order after
entry of judgment which affects substantial rights, in any civil action in the district court, any
party aggrieved may appeal therefrom to the supreme court or to the court of appeals, as appellate
jurisdiction may be vested by law in these courts." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
61. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
62. Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 614, 845 P.2d at 137.
63. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Harlow discusses the differences between

absolute and qualified immunity, their context of applicability, and the burden required to meet
each type of immunity.
64. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) fleshed out Cohen's collateral order doctrine as it
applies to decisions denying qualified immunity. Mitchell recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 gave
the appellate courts jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the district courts, but it also

clarified that 'finality' does not necessarily mean the last order possible in a particular case. Id.
The Court allowed an appeal on a qualified immunity issue because it was a final decision of a
claimed right which was separate from and collateral to the merits of the case. The Court concluded
that if the right to qualified immunity cannot be appealed before adjudication on their merits, the
right would be effectively lost. Id.
65. Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 616, 845 P.2d at 139. With the adoption of the collateral order
doctrine, New Mexico joined other federal circuit appellate courts and other state courts in determining
that an order denying qualified immunity is reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. Id. at
616 n.7.
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B. The Writ of Error as the ProceduralAvenue for Invoking the
Collateral Order Doctrine
The New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the collateral order doctrine
but reserved the freedom to apply the doctrine "as we deem appropriate
in future cases.'"' The court recognized that the collateral order doctrine
"if applied in too many contexts, [would] allow interruption of trial
court proceedings by any party claiming hardship because of postponement
of review-a result that the final-judgment rule seeks to prevent.' '67 The
court also noted that by denying immediate appeal to certain interlocutory
orders, the United States Supreme Court confined the application of the
collateral order doctrine to a narrow field of exceptions to final orders.6
Recognizing a judicial hostility to the doctrine, and the possibility of
trial interruption through piecemeal appeals, the New Mexico Supreme
Court chose a little used procedural device, the writ of error, for curbing
a wholesale use of the collateral order doctrine. 69 The court chose the
almost defunct writ of error over the writ of superintending control
reserving the writ of superintending control for specific categories of
cases such as fundamental rights, public interest, and 'erroneous, arbitrary, and tyrannical' order[s] of the lower courts." 70 In further explaining its choice, the court traced the constitutional and statutory
authority for the writ of error as a method of appellate review. 7'
In practice, a party who does not have an adequate remedy by way
of an appeal may make a timely application to the court for a writ of
error which would be issued solely at the discretion of the court. If the
court issues the writ, the procedure then follows the Rules of Appellate
Procedure: "If the writ of error is issued, the procedure thereafter shall
be the same'72as though a notice of appeal were filed on the date the
writ issues."

66. Id. at 617 n.9, 845 P.2d at 140 n.9.
67. Id. at 616, 845 P.2d at 139.

68. Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 616 n.8, 845 P.2d at 139 n.8 (citing Laura Lines S.R.L. v.Chasser,
490 U.S. 495 (1989)). The supreme court held that a district court's denial of defendant's motion
to dismiss damages on the basis of a contractual forum selection clause was not immediately
appealable under sec. 1291. The order was not final nor was the right to be sued only in a particular
forum destroyed or in danger of being irretrievably lost should a trial on the merits proceed to its
conclusion.
See also Van Cauwenberghe v.Biard, 486 U.S. 517 (1988) (in a civil fraud action, a denial of
defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that an extradited person is immune from civil process

was held not to be a final order, nor did it fit the narrow exception of the collateral order doctrine).
69. Id. at 616, 845 P.2d at 139.
70. Id. at 618, 845 P.2d at 141.

71. The Carrillo court traced the history of the writ of error as a method of appellate review
through New Mexico common law, through statute and through rules of appellate procedure. Carrillo,
114 N.M. app. at 623, 845 P.2d app. at 147.
"[T]he Supreme Court shall have ... power to issue writs of ... error .... Such writs may

be issued by direction of the court, or by any justice thereof." N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3. In
addition, New Mexico law provides for writs of error. "Writs of error to bring into the supreme
court any cause adjudged or determined in any of the district courts, as provided by law, may be
issued by the supreme court, or any justice thereof, if application is made within the time provided
by law for the taking of appeals." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1991)
72. N.M. R. APP. P. 12-503.
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In announcing its decision to adopt the collateral order doctrine and
the writ of error as its procedural avenue, the supreme court permitted
the denial of qualified immunity in Carrillo to retroactively stand for an
application to invoke the new doctrine. In so doing, the court certified
for review defendant's claim of qualified immunity on plaintiff's First
Amendment claim. 7"
C. Implications
The New Mexico Supreme Court clearly recognized that an injustice
may occur when an interlocutory order effectively disallowing a statutory
claim of right could not be brought before the court prior to a full
adjudication on the merits. In adopting the collateral order doctrine, the
New Mexico Supreme Court followed Cohen and Mitchell by allowing
an avenue of review for those rights which would be irretrievably lost
in the absence of an immediate appeal. However, the New Mexico Supreme
Court was careful in its adoption of the doctrine by retaining its own
discretionary powers to review or refuse to review various interlocutory
orders which may come before it under the writ of error. "We remain
74
free to apply the doctrine as we deem appropriate in future cases.''
Moreover, the New Mexico Supreme Court clearly recognized that an
abuse of the collateral order doctrine could delay and interrupt court
proceedings and could virtually nullify the final judgment rule of the
appeals procedure. 75 Thus, through the writ of error, the court effectively
narrowed the scope of the application of the collateral order doctrine
and maintained its own discretionary power to determine which appeals
fall within that scope.7 6 The court opened up a procedural avenue for
appeals from interlocutory orders collateral to the merits of a case, and
at the same time announced its control over the invocation and application
of the doctrine.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Carrillo, the New Mexico Supreme Court followed federal civil
procedure in adopting the collateral order doctrine. The doctrine permits
appeals from a narrow range of final orders which conclusively determine
a right of law separate from the merits of the case and which, if not
immediately appealable before final judgment, would essentially be unreviewable. The Carrillo court also selected the writ of error as the
procedural avenue for the doctrine, thus providing for the doctrine's
more narrowly circumscribed use.
VIRGINIA R. DUGAN

73. In reviewing the free speech issue, the court eventually held that the school board was not
entitled to pretrial immunity as contemplated in Harlow and Mitchell.
74. Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 617 n.9, 845 P.2d at 140 n.9.
75. Id. at 616, 845 P.2d at 139.
76. Id. at 627, 845 P.2d at 150.

